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In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase (1959) exposed deep foundations
via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled
scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise
endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners
perform an analogous function via the ―price system.‖ The government solution was inefficient
unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower.
Coase augured that the price system would outperform the administrative allocation system. His
spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry
interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took until July 25, 1994 for FCC license
sales to commence. Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been held, 27,484 licenses sold, and
$52.6 billion paid. The reform is a textbook example of economic policy success.
We examine Coase‘s seminal 1959 paper on two levels. First, we note the importance of its
analytical symmetry, comparing administrative to market mechanisms under the assumption of
positive transaction costs. This fundamental insight has had enormous influence within the
economics profession, yet is often lost in current analyses. This analytical insight had its
beginning in his acclaimed early article on the firm (Coase 1937), and continued into his
subsequent treatment of social cost (Coase 1960). Second, we investigate why spectrum policies
have stopped well short of the property rights regime that Coase advocated, considering rentseeking dynamics and the emergence of new theories challenging Coase‘s property framework.
One conclusion is easily rendered: competitive bidding is now the default tool in wireless license
awards. By rule of thumb, about $17 billion in U.S. welfare losses have been averted. Not bad
for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law &
Economics.

1

Paper for Markets, Firms, and Property Rights: A Celebration of the Research of Ronald Coase , Conference at
the University of Chicago School of Law (Dec. 4-5, 2009).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ronald Coase postulates that an economist who ―is able to postpone by a week a
government program which wastes $100 million a year (what I consider a modest success) has,
by his action, earned his salary for the whole of his life‖ (Coase 1975). By symmetry, this
standard applies when research brings a good law sooner. On that basis, Ronald Coase‘s single
paper, The Federal Communications Commission (―FCC‖) (Coase 1959), has created such a
bountiful account balance as to safely capitalize the Economists‘ Bank of Karma for generations
to come.
The FCC paper was written in the spirit of Adam Smith‘s WEALTH OF NATIONS. In
arguing a public policy position, Coase brought fundamentally new insights – disruptive clarities
-- to system dynamics. His meticulous reasoning was delivered in two healthy portions. The first
walked the reader through the argument for government planning as a solution to the so-called
externality problem, ―externality‖ being a term not used by Coase in either the FCC paper or the
1960 ―Social Cost‖ paper to follow (Coase 1960).2 By focusing, rather, on how ―harmful
effects‖ were rationally evaluated in economic markets, the generality of the spillover problem
was revealed. Social costs (externalities) were not exceptional cases and central planning was
not a zero-cost default.3 Governments and markets provide alternative forms of resource
coordination; determining the socially efficient mix requires symmetric appraisals. To posit
government taxes or controls as the costless default solution invokes the Nirvana Fallacy
(Demsetz 1969).
The second source of disruptive clarity consisted of Coase‘s deconstruction of the
government‘s logic to assign property rights by fiat. Regulators and the U.S. Supreme Court had
confused the resource allocation question – how airwaves were to be used – with the rights
ownership question – who got to use them. Licenses were assigned by comparative hearings
(―beauty contests‖) on the grounds that chaos would reign in the airwaves were the rights sold
like other economic goods. Coase, observing licenses traded in secondary markets, saw the
creation of resource use rights and the assignment of said rights as separable.
2

Coase explicitly avoided ―externality‖ in his attempt to show the generality of the resource allocation problem,
breaking loose from the Pigouvian paradigm that characterized products with spillovers as uniquely leading to
market failure. He thereby focused on alternative solutions to the resource problem, their costs, benefits and the
government‘s facilitative role in defining flexible spectrum rights whose particular utilization could be valued and
revalued in response to changing market and technological developments. Pigouvian static externality and its
subsequent mathematical treatment consistently failed to motivate problem-solving processes that could answer the
question of how and why government could implement regulations (or taxes) that would be efficient where markets
failed. See Coase (1988); Dahlman (1980).
3
Coase was keen to note such asymmetries in the economics literature. The object of his critique in the 1959 FCC
paper (Coase 1959) and then in his 1960, The Problem of Social Cost (Coase 1960), was A.C. Pigou‘s influential
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (Pigou 1920). Coase‘s The Marginal Controversy (Coase 1946), found a similar
‗zero cost for government policy‘ assumption embedded in the work of Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition
(Hotelling 1929). Hotelling led many economists, including Abba Lerner and Paul Samuelson, to postulate that
declining average cost goods were efficiently produced under a regime extending subsidies to suppliers who could
thereby recover fixed costs while pricing outputs at marginal cost. Coase noted that the approach implied that the
required information for classifying products (and technologies used to produce them) was freely available to the
government, and that such subsidies (and the taxes required to fund them) would not distort market feedback loops
revealing which projects to fund.
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Both lines of thought, institutional symmetry and the allocation-ownership dichotomy,
would figure prominently in Coase‘s seminal 1960 analysis, generally considered the most
frequently cited research paper in the history of economics (Hazlett and Coase 2009, p. 1). Here
we ponder issues more specifically related to Coase‘s work on radio spectrum, organized by the
two general strands delineated. In the first we evaluate spectrum policies under a positive
transaction costs framework4 helping to clarify recent critiques of Coase‘s property rights policy
proposal as either (a) difficult to implement, given the stochastic nature of radio signals, or (b)
obsolete, by virtue of newer digital radio technologies that permit the use of smart wireless
devices in ―spectrum commons.‖ Both attacks embed the Pigouvian asymmetry that the Coasean
analysis exposed.
In this paper, however, we focus largely on the widely adopted policy reform promoted in
the Coase paper of 1959: wireless license auctions. When offered, the suggestion was treated
with extreme hostility. Regulators, policy makers, industry officials, and academic experts were
of the opinion that Coase was ignorant of the technical characteristics of radio spectrum and
incorrect as to his allegedly radical economic analysis. Auctions would not only be bad policy,
they would be impossible: airwaves were not susceptible to definition as property.
Coase‘s responses were sound, yet we need not rehash them. Over 30 other countries
have run the experiment. On July 25, 1994, e.g., the Federal Communications Commission
commenced Auction No. 1, selling ten Narrowband Personal Communications Services (N-PCS)
licenses used for paging services. Aggregate winning bids of $617 million were generated.
While N-PCS failed to prove profitable,5 the government captured significant revenues and
moved to hold additional auctions. In March 1995, 99 broadband personal communications
services licenses (PCS) offering rights enabling competition with cellular operators were sold for
$7 billion. Through 2008, 73 FCC auctions were held, 27,484 wireless licenses sold, and $52.6
billion collected from winning bidders.6 See Appendix 1.
Auctions are now a well-established license assignment tool. ―[S]pectrum auctions in the
US have been a great success,‖ (Scanlan 2001, p. 690) a viewpoint widely shared by economists
(Milgrom 2004). Policy makers have been energetic in claiming credit for their implementation.
Indeed, wireless auctions now constitute a textbook example of efficient regulatory reform. That
Coase persevered in his analytical enterprise when his work was questioned by all about him, is a
tribute to his character, the quality of his thought, and the substance of the economic model on
which he built.
Coase (1959) is far less famous a work than its elaboration in Coase (1960). That paper
was published pursuant to an invitation for a correction from JLE editors, who claimed that it
erred in its treatment of externalities. But the editors of this JOURNAL were wrong; the Federal
Communications Commission paper did not commit a ―very interesting error‖ (Coase 1993, p.
250) but offered a lucid correction. We focus on two aspects of that analysis here:
4

See Coase Theorem discussion below.
Paging services had been profitable, but were about to be displaced by cellular services. (Murray 2001).
6
Statement by FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin, News Release, Federal Communications Commission (March 18,
2009) and FCC website. For a summary of FCC reported auction results, see Appendix 1.
5
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(1) Symmetric evaluation of resource appropriation rules. Coase thought clearly about
the economics of damaging spillovers: they were byproducts of valuable activities and, as such,
were productive inputs subject to the same cost-benefit calculus as other resources. This
understanding led Coase to view legal rules not as palliatives for market failures, but as
mechanisms to discover trade-offs and achieve optimal outcomes. As soon as this task is made
clear, and the complex nature of the changing opportunities realized, it is apparent that a
government-managed process is simply one alternative, while markets form the standard default
in a modern economy. The role of economic analysis was not to assume away the problem by
the deus ex machina of no-cost public regulation, but to compare institutional options, apples-toapples. This common sense was uncommon, and it exposed the theoretical weakness of an
economic paradigm that proved market failure while assuming perfect governments.
(2) The public policy of auctioning radio frequency ownership rights. This signature
policy payoff of Coase‘s 1959 paper begs the query: what other scholarly article has helped
trigger such enormous real-world changes? Competitive bidding for wireless license awards, a
reform uniformly traced to Coase (1959), began in New Zealand in 1989, in the U.S. in 1994,
and is now employed in dozens of countries. License assignments have proceeded as suggested,
eliminating costly delays and inefficiencies. Yet license auctions do not enable market allocation
of radio spectrum, and may in fact exacerbate the artificial scarcity imposed by regulation. U.S.
policy has, in recent years, been stymied by policy retrogression, under-allocating bandwidth for
mobile networks and rejecting liberal licenses in favor of ―re-regulation.‖ Some of the problem
can be traced to Coase‘s ―bundle of rights‖ property agnosticism (addressed previously by
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith 2001), which now calls for amendment. We modestly propose
a Coase (1959) 2.0 Edition that incorporates fifty years of wireless market experience to extend
the efficiencies of license auctions to spectrum markets.
Coasean Disruption may be just getting started.

II. TWO SYMMETRIES AND ONE EMPIRICALLY TESTABLE PRESUMPTION
Coase (1959) brought clarity to resource economics by exposing two asymmetries in the
existing analysis, and then tucking these insights into the comfortable paradigm of Adam Smith‘s
―invisible hand.‖ First, he revealed that cost ―externalities‖ were not special cases but standard
economic inputs (or outputs). The social goal is not to eliminate (maximize) them but to
maximize economic value.7 Second, the challenges encountered in doing so were not, uniquely,
market failures. They were real-world problems confronted by government regulators or private
owners. To assert that markets broke down when they failed to optimally deploy resources was
unhelpful; it said nothing about the relative success of some alternative set of rules. Direct
government regulation, tax/subsidy schemes, and private property rights – including the many
variants of each – were to be empirically evaluated to determine the best methods for
7

It should be noted that Pigou (1920) did not seek to categorically suppress spillovers, but to incrementally tax or
subsidize allocation choices so as to force decision makers to rationally account for them. But where Pigou saw
certain types of markets as subject to special policy interventions due to ―externalities,‖ Coase brought clarity by
showing how the allocation of ―harmful effects‖ (or ―beneficial effects‖) was just another resource use question.
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maximizing net social output. Third, Coase was not agnostic about where the analysis would
trend. Coase anticipated that full, fair, well-informed evaluations would find that decentralized
resource owners generally outperformed state diktat.
These insights profoundly influenced development of both theory and empirical research.
Yet, we note that much of the essential wisdom has yet to permeate ongoing economic
discussion, particularly in the policy realm in which the Coasean analysis began – radio spectrum
allocation. We address each of these contributions in this light.
a. Opportunity Costs of Reducing “Harmful Effects”
The U.S. Supreme Court argued in 1943 that, because ―there is a fixed natural limitation
upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering with one another,‖8 the
government was virtually forced to tightly control spectrum use. Without such central
administration, endemic interference between stations would produce chaos, what a later Court
would dub ―a cacophony of competing voices.‖9
Coase confronted the Supreme Court‘s ―misunderstanding of the nature of the problem
(Coase 1959, p. 14),‖ and made a remarkable discovery. First, the limited nature of frequencies
simply suggested a scarcity constraint. Countless other scarce resources were efficiently
allocated by ―the price system.‖10 Second, whatever spectrum use rights were assigned to
wireless users could be assigned by auctions rather than fiat. This was an idea proposed initially
by University of Chicago Law student Leo Herzel in 1951, who suggested this approach not after
studying under Milton Friedman or Aaron Director, but having read Abba Lerner‘s THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTROL (1944) (Coase 1993, see also Herzel 1951). He was a good student:
selling rights to the highest bidder was a logical way for a socialist system to theoretically
rationalize distribution. While then controversial, the proposition cannot be in dispute: today the
FCC does precisely this.11
Coase‘s third argument went much further. The government mitigated conflicts between
users by sharply limiting resource use – a regime that ―relies exclusively on regulation and in
which private property and the pricing system play no part‖ (Coase 1959, p. 34) – but could
potentially achieve the same objective far more efficiently. However it initially defined resource
use rights, it could allow users to recontract. Rights holders would then generate gains from
trade, reducing interference when neighboring frequency users paid them more than they gave
up, either accepting higher levels of airwave congestion or using mitigation techniques of their
own – improved technology, adjusted operations, or relocation. In this manner, users would act
like property owners, searching for ways to increase the value of their assets.

8

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 219 U.S. 190 (1943), p. 213.
Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
10
―Land, labor and capital are all scarce, but this, of itself, does not call for government regulation.‖ (Coase 1959,
p. 14).
11
The alert reader will note that the issue should not have been in dispute in 1959, either, as radio and television
stations traded freely in the marketplace – licenses and all. But such transactions did not appear to settle the matter,
as witnessed by the experts‘ consensus denouncing the suggestion as hopelessly naïve.
9
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One of the purposes of the legal system is to establish that clear delimitation of
rights on the basis of which the transfer and recombination of rights can take
place through the market. In the case of radio, it should be possible for someone
who is granted the use of a frequency to arrange to share it with someone else,
with whatever adjustments to hours of operation, power, location and kind of
transmitter, etc., as may be mutually agreed upon; or when the right initially
acquired is the shared use of a frequency (and in certain cases the FCC has
permitted only shared usage), it should not be made impossible for one user to
buy out the rights of the other users so as to obtain an exclusive usage (Coase
1959, p. 25).
This angle led Coase to see that the ―externalities‖ were resource use conflicts entirely
analogous to the input costs that firms routinely incurred in producing valuable goods and
services. When clearly owned, they were rationally allocated. What made them seem to be of a
special character were circumstances making private ownership ill-defined.12 But those
circumstances were not automatically eliminated by state ownership, government regulation, or a
tax and subsidy scheme. Such approaches were just another way to deal with the same conflicts
over alternative resource use. The confusion was apparent in radio spectrum, where private
ownership was said to be impossible – but where regulators allegedly averted potential chaos by
issuing rules excluding most resource uses so that they could award protected, unobstructed use
rights to lucky licensees.
Coase saw that such rights could be more efficiently and transparently distributed by
auction. But that was a very limited reform, because ―the enforcement of such detailed
regulations for the operation of stations as are now imposed by the Federal Communications
Commission would severely limit the extent to which the way the frequency was used could be
determined by the forces of the market‖ (Coase 1959, p. 25). If emission rights were broadened
to constitute ownership of frequencies, then private owners could deploy new technologies,
services, and business models, make deals across FCC-defined borders, adjust to changing
circumstances, and remix combinations of factors – including spectral inputs -- to discover the
optimal level of interference. In a dynamically changing world, such efficiencies would be
continually updated.
Such owners would not eliminate spillovers but be motivated to discover the efficient
levels and types. Some owners would buy neighboring (or distant) rights to emit, others sell, all
comparing costs to benefits in order to maximize the value of their slices. The result would be a
complex balancing. This was starkly at odds with the prevailing view that ―harmful
interference‖ was destructive and would be endemic without pervasive regulatory management
of radio use. ―It is sometimes implied that the aim of regulation in the radio industry should be
to minimize interference. But this would be wrong. The aim should be to maximize output‖
(Coase 1959, p. 27).
Over time, spectrum ownership rights for certain types of licenses did expand, coming to
resemble private ownership of the bandwidth allocated to the FCC license. For mobile wireless
12

Owners have, most essentially, the right to exclude others from appropriating their property. When lines cannot
be drawn to delineate borders, the effort to define rights suffers.
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services, in particular, spectrum authorities in the U.S. and elsewhere have granted liberal rights
that delegate the choice of technologies, services, and business models largely to the licensee.
This regulatory reform has generated enormous value in assisting the efficient organization of
markets (Hazlett 2008). The problem is that it has been parsimoniously applied, allotting
relatively little spectrum to liberal licenses, and continuing the use of the state property regime
for allocations. This provokes new challenges for economic policy, as discussed below.
b. Institutional Symmetry, and the Incredible Lightness of Stigler’s “Coase Theorem”
What has come to be called the Coase Theorem, courtesy of George Stigler, 13 obscures
the Coasean analyses of 1959 and 1960 and leads to hazardous analytical detours. 14 The
Stiglerian version is that, with zero transaction costs, resources will be efficiently deployed no
matter which party is endowed with ownership rights. This discussion, with these conditions,
appears in Coase (1960) not as a ―theorem‖ but to critique the existing economic theory that
assumed away information and transactions cost when actions were taken by the state. Coase,
noting that the assumptions employed produced no market (or non-market) failure, then focused
on situations with positive transaction costs as the real analytical challenge. Efficient liability
rules would be found by comparing the more effective organizational rules when all costs were
included.
Misplaced reliance on the zero transaction cost assumption obscures Coase‘s central
message. This diversion is of large consequence in that such a default position is easily toppled.
The case for Pigouvian taxes or state property ownership is reconstituted via demonstration of
―transaction costs.‖
This does great violence to Coase‘s analysis on multiple levels. First, it implicitly takes
―transaction costs‖ as a fixed feature of markets, exogenous from the legal rules or regulations
imposed by the state.15 This is clearly incorrect; the way property rights are defined has great
bearing on how such rights can be productively used in the marketplace. 16 Second, when rights
are defined and distributed by the state in ways that hamper efficiency, the resulting ―tragedy‖ is
properly a non-market failure. By refusing to undertake transactions that are, given their cost,
not worth the benefits sought, private property owners make efficient choices (Demsetz 2003).
What needs to be fixed is the legal structure.

13

―This proposition, that when there are no transaction costs the assignments of legal rights have no effect on the
allocation of resources among economic enterprises… I christened… the Coase Theorem.‖ (Stigler 1988, p. 77).
14
This conclusion has been rendered by Ronald Coase (1988) himself.
15
―The exclusive use model should be applied primarily but not exclusively in bands where scarcity is relatively
high and transaction costs associated with market-based negotiation of access rights are relatively low. The
commons model should be applied primarily but not exclusively in bands where scarcity is relatively low and
transaction costs are relatively high.‖ Federal Communications Commission, Spectrum Policy Task Force Report
(Nov. 15, 2002), p. 5. We note the FCC‘s confused terminology, referring to the private property model as
―exclusive use,‖ when such bandwidth constitutes the most intensively shared frequency spaces in economic terms,
and to unlicensed bands as ―commons,‖ when such frequencies are regulated by governance rules imposed by the
FCC under administrative allocation.
16
For instance, a tragedy of the anti-commons ensues when rights are defined in fragmented, overlapping contours
that are prohibitively costly to reassemble. See (Heller 2008).
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Third, Coase (1959) is clear in its focus on symmetric comparison of the (positive)
transactions costs faced by government in parceling out limited use rights for wireless
applications, on the one hand, and an alternative system in which private entities owned the
frequencies. Either set of decision makers (regulators v. owners) would have to make choices.
Coase saw, for example, that the allocation of a given block of frequencies for television
broadcasting, to the exclusion of other services, was not pre-determined by engineering rules.17
It was a choice made by regulators that reflected their belief that the value obtained from this use
of bandwidth exceeded the value of the excluded opportunities. There were other ways to
perform the same coordination.
It was not sufficient to merely posit a market failure to establish a case for administrative
allocation. One had to consider the operational effectiveness of one system against the
alternatives. As sensible as the conclusion was, it was radical at the time. An academic (and
FCC Chief Economist), Dallas Smythe, dismissed market allocation as theoretically imperfect
and therefore irrelevant. Coase responded:
Professor Smythe also argued that the use of market controls depends on ‗the
economic assumption that there is substantially perfect competition in the
electronics field.‘ This is a somewhat extreme view. An allocation scheme costs
something to administer, will itself lead to a misallocation of resources, and may
encourage some monopolistic tendencies – all of which might well make us
willing to tolerate a considerable amount of imperfect competition before
substituting an allocation scheme for market controls (Coase 1959, p. 16).
Coase explained that there is no such thing as a free allocation system. The efficient
social choice considered the disparate options, symmetrically. That is not a result of the zero
transaction cost assumption, but its opposite.
c. The Market Efficiency Default
While Coase went ―looking for results,‖18 he was not agnostic. He analyzed radio
spectrum in 1959 as Adam Smith had analyzed commodity markets in 1776. The ―invisible
hand‖ had much to offer. A CBS broadcast executive expressed surprise when asked at a 1958
congressional hearing about the possibility that the ―avenues of the air‖ should be sold by the
Government such that ―the taxpayer would be getting the proceeds‖ (Coase 1959, p. 17). Coase
delights in quoting the broadcaster‘s response, ―[t]his is a new and novel concept,‖ 19 offering the
retort: ―This ‗novel theory‘ (novel with Adam Smith) is, of course, that the allocation of

17

―[I]t is not clear why we should have to rely on the Federal Communications Commission rather than the
ordinary pricing mechanism to decide whether a particular frequency should be used by the police, or for a
radiotelephone, or for a taxi service, or for an oil company for geophysical exploration, or by a motion-picture
company to keep in touch with its film stars or for a broadcasting station. Indeed, the multiplicity of these varied
uses would suggest that the advantages to be derived from relying on the pricing mechanism would be especially
great in this case.‖ (Coase 1959, p. 16.).
18
Interview with Thomas W. Hazlett, REASON (Jan. 1997).
19
Ibid.
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resources should be determined by the forces of the market rather than as a result of government
decisions‖ (Coase 1959, p. 18).
Coase argued that the regulatory agency was unlikely to exhibit comparative advantage in
allocating bandwidth. Competitive markets would reveal opportunity costs and reward
entrepreneurial efforts to identify potential benefits from innovation, improving social
coordination. In this, Coase operated mainly from theory, not from his own detailed examination
of alternative regulatory models. With the liberalization of certain important wireless licenses
over the past half-century, however, the evidence is overwhelming: the normative
recommendation was largely correct (Hazlett 2008; Hazlett & Leo 2011).

III. THE INTELLECTUAL PIVOT FOR AUCTIONS
When Ronald Coase began his investigation of public policy for radio spectrum,
communications policy experts in the U.S. widely held that radio spectrum rights were optimally
held by the state: markets would under-produce ―public interest‖ outputs. Grounded in the
genesis of spectrum allocation for radio broadcasting, policy makers opposed market-driven
rights allocations because they would ―emasculate ‗socially desirable‘ censorship.‖20 But many
analysts went much further, asserting that spectrum could only be held by the government.
Property rights could not be auctioned because they could not be defined. ―Rights to use the
spectrum are not susceptible to legal enforcement as are private property rights‖ (Melody 1980,
p.392). Airwave spillovers led to economic externalities, which would destroy market allocation
– that was the theory-driven story. When Coase explained the actual problem as delimiting
rights, which could be achieved using one set of rules or the other (public ownership v. private
ownership), the response from academic and policy experts was emphatically negative.
Invited to the FCC to testify about his novel approach to spectrum allocation in 1959, the
first question posed was Commissioner Philip Cross‘ query: ―Tell us, Professor, is this all a big
joke?‖ (Coase 1993). In 1962, the Rand Corporation commissioned Coase and two other
economists to write a detailed proposal to implement the suggested policy regime. Rand then
suppressed the 200-page report when the think tank was warned of its potentially explosive
political implications.21 In 1965, a Federal Communications Commission official explained why
the response to Coase was so uniformly hostile: ―After the initial shock of rationally considering
the use of the pricing mechanism in frequency allocations, the virtually unanimous view of
communications specialists would be that the multiplicity of users both national and
international…, the interference characteristics of radio with signals at relatively low energy
levels interfering at diverse points many hundreds of miles away… and the hundreds of
thousands of licensees involved in addition to the many millions of consumers make the pricing
mechanism unworkable for frequency allocation‖ (Goldin 1965, p. 168). When, in the mid1970s, Coase‘s call for auctions was (finally) taken up by an FCC member, it was promptly

20

As economist Jora Minasian stated the argument against auctions (Minasian 1975, p. 268).
The episode is explained in Coase (1998). The 1962 paper was finally released by Rand in 1995 – one
year after FCC auctions commenced. (Coase, Meckling and Minasian 1995).
21
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ridiculed by two fellow Commissioners who announced that its adoption garnered the same odds
―as those on the Easter Bunny in the Preakness.‖22
The intense opposition to competitive bidding was curious to Coase. The arguments
were made that (1) radio emission rights could not be defined to be sold; (2) even if such rights
could be traded, market assignments would under-supply public interest outputs like local news
or educational programming. But the first premise was demonstrably untrue, as the licenses that
were assigned by regulators were routinely re-assigned by the price system; secondary market
transactions had been revealing the existence of substantial rents since the 1920s. And the
second seemed to Coase to clash with common sense. The conditions placed on licensees could
be imposed in a regime where licenses were distributed by auction, with rents (reduced by the
expected costs of the embedded obligations) captured for the public. The objection to market
assignments seemed simply to be in error.
Here Coase missed the political dynamics. One advantage of an auction regime is that it
improves transparency, forcing regulators to state terms and conditions. But policy makers and
broadcasters are able to generate mutual gains – trading rents for regulatory influence over
content -- by incomplete revelation of terms.
Policy makers had good reasons to fear a loss of control over broadcasting were auctions
to be implemented. Assigning rights to radio and television stations by competitive bidding
rather than administrative fiat eliminated non-arms length transactions and thereby reduced the
scope for ―regulation by raised eyebrow‖ – a term of art at the FCC.23 The license was
commonly referenced as a quid pro quo, with rents awarded to licensees in exchange for ―public
interest‖ outputs (see e.g., Hazlett and Spitzer 2000). In reality, the enumerated social benefits
rarely materialized. By the FCC‘s own admission, the ―public interest‖ programming gambit
was a failure, producing a ―vast wasteland,‖ as FCC Chairman Newton Minow famously
described TV fare in 1961 (Minow 1964, p. 45-69). In 1976, Commissioner Glen O. Robinson
likened broadcast regulation to ―a charade—a wrestling match full of fake grunts and groans but
signifying nothing‘‘ (Geller 1994, p. 15). As economist Bruce Owen deduced from the empirical
evidence, the FCC ―does not live up to its own theory of regulation‖ (Owen 1982, p. 36).
Yet the lack of productive outputs did not mean that the regime was not a success in
achieving certain politically popular ends. Evidence of that success was seen in the extreme
hostility to auctions cited above, and in the fact that is was particularly concentrated among those
who benefited the most from the exercise of power over assignments -- committees in Congress
overseeing FCC operations. While budget and appropriations committees had long sought to
obtain revenues from licenses, the respective commerce committees (overseeing
telecommunications regulation) blocked reform. In Feb. 1987, Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH), a
member of the Senate Commerce Committee, sprayed cold water on the Federal
22

Broadcast Renewal Applicant, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 434 n.2 (1977) (Commissioners Hooks and Fogarty, separate
statement). See Robinson (1978, p. 243).
23
The term, coined by Nixon-appointed FCC Chair Dean Burch, has been defined by federal courts this way:
―Thus, licensee political or artistic expression is particularly vulnerable to the 'raised eyebrow' of the FCC; faced
with the threat of economic injury, the licensee will choose in many cases to avoid controversial speech in order to
forestall that injury. Examples of this process are legion.‖ Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 169
U.S. App. D.C. 166, 515 F.2d 397 (1974)
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Communications Commission proposal to authorize license sales because it ``will aid
monopolies…. You won't get anywhere with this, so why don't you go back to the drawing
board?'' (Kwerel and Rosston, p. 258). In May 1987, Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-HI), Chair of the
Senate Subcommittee on Communications, rebuffed a colleague, Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-FL),
Chair of the Senate Budget Committee, telling him that an auction ―undercuts the fundamental
tenet in communications policy that the airwaves are a limited public resource [and it] is
inappropriate to sell such a resource to the highest bidder‖ (Kwerel and Rosston, p. 258). The
Chair of the House Commerce Committee, John Dingell (D-MI), then introduced 1989
legislation with a section: ―PROHIBITION OF SPECTRUM AUCTION‖ (Kwerel and Rosston, p. 258).
The bill was simply a blunt object waved in a threatening manner; the FCC had no statutory
authority to conduct auctions.
Yet this political animosity was dissipating over time. Broadcasting – the object of the
―fundamental tenet in communications policy‖ – was being eclipsed in economic importance by
emerging wireless telephone services. In 1993, with U.S. policy for second generation (2G)
services lagging, with a newly unified national government (the Democratic Party controlled
both the Presidency and the Congress for the first time in 12 years), with the transparent
squandering of billions of dollars in rents in the 1984-89 cellular license lotteries as predicate,
the system was primed for reform (Hazlett 1998). Congress authorized auctions in the 1993
budget, mandating that they be used to distribute PCS, but not broadcasting, licenses and gave
the Federal Communications Commission a one-year deadline to initiate competitive bidding.24
The demonstration effect was powerful. Once sales commenced, distributing licenses
economically, the consensus of the communications experts was exposed and broken.25 The
burden shifted: what was to justify a system in which licenses were not assigned to high bidders?
Moreover, the new flow of federal receipts shifted the political equilibrium. Stalwart opponents
of auctions now sought to take credit. Pedestrians in Washington D.C. found it hazardous to
inadvertently stroll between a television news crew and an FCC Chairman brandishing an
auction check for the Treasury.26 The Commission issued notices boasting that it was a
government profit center.27 While tantamount to a real estate agent assuming credit for the
market value of the property sold, the claim did possess a germ of historical veracity: prior to
24

The process by which the FCC acted quickly to create an auction mechanism is described in Evan Kwerel‘s
Preface to Milgrom (2004). Dr. Kwerel, then and now a Senior Economist at the FCC, was the FCC official who led
the agency‘s auction planning.
25
Auction rules employed by the FCC were crafted on a strict timeline and reflected an understanding that initial
auction outcomes were politically important. Were haphazard procedures to produce confusion, legal challenges, or
long delays, the backlash might well eliminate the reforms. FCC staff, largely enthusiastic supporters of auctions,
were influential in steering the Commission towards fairly simple auction formats, and to testing mechanisms prior
to deployments. While we will see that such caution was soon compromised by the bidder subsidies extended in
Auction 5 (May 1996), it was crucial that the first four auctions ran smoothly, resulted in orderly license
assignments (and wireless deployments), and collected over $8 billion for the Treasury. See (Kwerel and Rosston
2000); (Porter and Smith2006).
26
Auction receipts go to the U.S. Treasury, not the FCC. However, the FCC is allowed to claim a fraction of
auction receipts to cover the cost of administering auctions. This fraction is not large.
27
After the March 1995 broadband PCS auction, the FCC ―blew up a huge check [of $7.7 billion] to give the
President. The picture ran in newspapers across the country. .. I told the press that the FCC had raised more money
than its total budget for its 61-year history. We were, I said, the most profitable American business in terms of return
on equity.‖ (Hundt 2000, p. 96) . (Hundt was Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, 1993-97.)
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1994, the Government had squandered such rents in favor of ―beauty contests‖ and lotteries
(Krewel and Felker 1985; Hazlett and Michaels 1993).
Worse for democratic institutions, government policy makers were enmeshed in a
fundamental conflict of interest, setting rules for electronic speech, including content regulations
such as the ―equal time rule‖ (imposed by statute in 1927) and the ―fairness doctrine‖ (imposed
by the FCC in 1949), while their electoral fortunes relied on the information supplied to the
public by these media outlets. Even in arms length oversight, regulators were constrained to
evaluate licensees with regard to political considerations. And not always were regulations arms
length. Texas Congressman Lyndon Johnson amassed a personal fortune by forming a political
alliance with the chairman of the FCC, befriending staffers of the agency, and then manipulating
regulatory decisions to land his wife under-priced ownership of TV and radio stations – a process
called by one observer, ―government between friends‖ (Caro 1991, p. 94). Later, when President
of the United States, ―Johnson would summon the appropriate CBS personnel to the White
House to complain that CBS was charging one of his TV stations too much for syndicated
programming.‖ The problem was solved when CBS News President Frank Stanton ―told his
staff to furnish the program to the station free‖ (Ray 1990, p. 41). During the Nixon years,
networks considered implicit threats of license renewal problems in response to purported media
bias to be just another cost of doing business.28 Coase, aware of the potential for such corruption
and First Amendment compromise, argued for competitive bidding as an antidote (Coase 1965).
The policy regime switch exposed a fundamental fact: the use of auctions was not
revolutionary. Licenses that had been defined by policymakers before would continue to be
defined, if governments so desired, in precisely the same manner. The traditional license, as
allocated to television broadcasting, affords a right to operate a wireless business as strictly
defined by the license. Transmission technology, business models (ad supported, not
subscription), services (broadcast video, not two-way broadband), and even the location of
transmitters were specified by regulators. Indeed, for TV and many other services, it still is:
―almost all spectrum licenses have restrictions that specify the particular use to which bandwidth
must be put‖ (Faulhaber 2006, p. 262). The auction reform formally leaves this regime intact.

IV. EFFICIENCIES OF LICENSE AUCTIONS
Assigning wireless licenses by competitive bidding has markedly improved the
administrative process wherein spectrum rights are awarded to licensees (Cramton 2002).
Efficiencies include private sector savings on lobbying activity associated with ―comparative
hearings,‖ contests to establish the ―public interest‖ bona fides of rival bidders for licenses.
28

A Sept. 25, 1970 memo written by presidential aide Charles Colson to Nixon White House Press Secretary Herb
Klein detailed meetings in New York City where Colson had recently visited the heads of all three commercial
broadcasting networks, pressuring them to report on the Nixon Administration more favorably. ―I had to break
every meeting. The networks badly want to have these kinds of discussions which they said they had had with other
Administrations but never with ours. They told me any time we had a complaint about slanted coverage for me to
call them directly. [CBS President Ed] Paley said that he would like to come down to Washington and spend time
with me anytime that I wanted. M In short, they are very much afraid of us and are trying hard to prove they are
‗good guys.‘" Quoted in Bazelon (1975, p. 246).
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They are also an improvement over lotteries, authorized for use by the U.S. Congress in 1981 as
a compromise (Congress not wanting to grant the Reagan Administration auction authority),
which were curiously conducted under the fiction that those applying for random selection were
actual phone companies. Thousands of new ―phone companies‖ materialized, on paper,
submitting detailed engineering drawings and proof of operating experience, such evidence
purchased from consulting firms and technology suppliers at considerable cost.29 This charade
created such massive filings, with hundreds of thousands of applications submitted for 1,468
cellular licenses (two issued in each of 734 franchise areas), that an FCC warehouse storing these
documents collapsed. Between $500 million and $1 billion was squandered in rent seeking
waste (Hazlett and Michaels 1993).
But the largest costs were borne by consumers, technology suppliers, and investors after
the non-auctioned licenses were assigned. Given U.S. regulators‘ penchant for issuing large
numbers of geographically (and, often, spectrally) small licenses, extensive secondary market
transactions were needed to assembly efficient spectrum blocks. To serve a national marketplace
with mobile wireless, e.g., operators have acquired literally thousands of licenses – more than
50,000 FCC wireless licenses are today held by mobile carriers (of which there are just four
national operators) (Hazlett 2003). Such aggregations have been expensive; an estimated $190
million on brokers‘ fees alone was spent in 1991 in cellular license deals.30
More deleteriously, it took years to collect assets, delaying and degrading services.31
The use of auctions in the primary market has speeded this process, reducing social expense.
Paul Milgrom references the general set of transaction costs involved in reconfiguring license
rights in secondary markets in writing:
The history of the US wireless telephone service offers direct evidence that the
fragmented and inefficient initial distribution of rights was not quickly correctable
by market transactions. Despite demands from consumers for nationwide
networks and the demonstrated successes of similarly wide networks in Europe,
such networks were slow to develop in the United States (Milgrom 2004, p. 20).
Such post-assignment delays were likely mitigated with the use of auctions. In the
important PCS A, B auction, held from Dec. 1994 to March 1995, one firm – Sprint – emerged
with 29 of 51 licenses needed for complete national coverage using 30 MHz. This yielded Sprint
– a new mobile entrant -- direct access to 147 million potential subscribers (more than half U.S.
population) (Gruber 2005, p. 238). With roaming agreements, themselves easier to execute
given the defragmentation of licenses elsewhere, Sprint began providing services by late 1995.
This foray, along with additional regional network consolidations enabled in the PCS A/B

29

The forms verified that a group of investors could build and operate a cellular phone company, proof of which
was purchased from actual telecommunications suppliers in exchange for contracts to provide such services
(contingent on the lottery applicants being selected).
30
Federal Communications Commission, FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, WT Docket No. 97-150
(Oct. 9, 1997), 22.
31
Total aggregation costs would include the services deterred due to delayed network buildouts, as well as
negotiating costs incurred to deal with strategic hold-outs.
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auction and the formation of Nextel,32 disrupted the existing cellular duopoly imposed by virtual
of the fact that just two FCC licenses had been issued in each local franchise area.
The auction exposed the fact that mobile licenses were complements; significant value
was created when adjacent licenses were purchased by bidders.33
Productive gains were
possible via the assembly of efficient packages, eliminating uneconomic rights distributions.34
Of course, PCS licenses also enabled competitive entry, ending the cellular duopoly. Large
gains to consumers ensued. Wireless carriers undercut terrestrial long-distance charges,
encouraging substitution from fixed to mobile networks. The key marketing innovation began in
May 1998 with instantly popular digital ―one rate plans,‖ offering large buckets of ―nationwide
minutes.‖35
As seen in Figure 1, average revenue per minute fell from over 50 cents prior to the PCS
auction to just 6.4 cents in 2007, a nominal reduction of 87% -- at least 70% below the pre-PCS
trend. Most of this sharp decline was achieved via a huge increase in minutes of use, encouraged
by flat rate pricing (capped during peak calling times, unlimited off-peak).
FIG. 1. U.S. CELLULAR RETAIL PRICES BEFORE AND AFTER PCS AUCTIONS36

PCS A & B
Licenses
Auctioned

32

AT&T
‘Digital
One Rate’

23.0¢ -> 6.4¢ = 72.0%

Fleet Call was a wireless operator built on so-called taxi dispatch licenses, officially known as Specialized
Mobile Radio (SMR) services. An entrepreneurial former FCC lawyer, Morgan O‘Brien, purchased rights to many
of these licenses, allocated 800 MHz and 900 MHz spectrum (very near cellular frequencies) and obtained
permission from the regulator in 1990 to replace analog systems with digital technologies. In a lobbying coup for
the upstart, the request (heavily opposed by incumbent cellular operators) was granted. This enabled the firm,
renamed Nextel, to operate on up to 15 MHz. (See Hazlett 2001, p. 387-88.) Nextel served 12 million subscribers
before being sold to Sprint for $35 billion in 2005.
33
See (Ausbel, et al. 1997); (Moreton and Spiller 1998).
34
This was also seen in the substantial premium paid by bidders for the large regional licenses in Auction 66 (for
Advanced Wireless Services licenses) in Sept. 2006. See analysis below.
35
Federal Communications Commission, CMRS Fifth Annual Report (2000).
36
CTIA data.
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Competitive bidding for licenses may have encouraged regulators to continue to divvy up
airwave rights in highly fragmented parcels. In 73 auctions conducted by the FCC from July
1994 through November 2008, the Commission sold some 27,484 licenses.37 This radical (and
globally distinct) fragmentation of licenses has been partially mitigated by the implementation of
auctions.38 Blocks of spectrum rights have been more efficiently aggregated, invigorating retail
competition.39 Similar licenses have sold for similar prices, adjusting for timing and other
financial differences, and for synergies between licenses (Ausbel, et. al. 1997; Moreton and
Spiller 1998).
Revenues generated by license auctions have assumed both economic and political
importance. To economists, the rents transferred to governments create public financing
efficiencies. Each dollar raised theoretically offsets another dollar which would have – but for
the auction receipts – been raised via taxes that distort market behavior. A rule of thumb
associates each dollar of public revenue via taxation with approximately 33¢ in (additional) lost
social benefit (Klempter 2002, p. 179). Through 2008, some $52 billion had been collected by
the U.S. Government for license sales, suggesting perhaps about $17 billion in economic welfare
delivered via the public financing bonus.
Such gains dissipate, however, if the spectrum allocation system intentionally distorts
wireless markets in order to increase bids. There is a sharp conflict between government
maximizing its auction revenue and assigning spectrum rights so as to enable wireless market
efficiency. Because license revenues are easily dominated by consumer surplus generated by the
wireless services enabled (Hazlett and Muñoz 2009), it is penny-wise and pound foolish to
restrict competition (or, equivalently, delay license sales) in order to goose up auction receipts.
This is a lesson that is still being learned by policy makers, as discussed below.

V. INEFFICIENCIES IN THE LICENSE AUCTION REGIME
1. Bidder Collusion
FCC auction procedures initially gave bidders incentives to signal – and collude – by
using bids that detailed what markets they were most keenly interested in winning.
Communications were achieved by placing bids that used the last three decimal places to mark
desired territory. A bid of $36,000,326, say, would indicate a decided interest in the bidder
winning License No. 326. This bidding strategy was labeled the trailing digits play.
To eliminate this practice, the FCC no longer allows bidders to submit their own
(custom) bid amounts; they must select from incremental bids specified by the FCC (Cramton
and Schwartz 2002; Bajari and Yeo 2008). Other methods employed by bidders may signal their
intentions, however. One of the most pervasive strategies, which has garnered attention in the
37

FCC website. The number is slightly inflated by the re-auction of some licenses.
Aggregation problems exacerbated by the lack of combination bidding are discussed below.
39
Federal Communications Commission, FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, WT Docket No. 97-150
(Oct. 9, 1997), 22.
38
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economics literature, is that of jump bidding. This strategy registers bids one or more increments
above the prescribed minimum. The approach is designed to signal the strength of the bidder,
―scaring away‖ rivals contesting a license. It may also secure a license for which the bidder may
not have the highest value, but where a higher bidder‘s valuation proves less than the winning
bid plus the minimum increment.40 Another strategy, euphemistically called upping yourself,
occurs when a bidder increases their own bid despite being the standing high bid on a license.
Ordinarily, this is viewed as a patently irrational action in auction theory. Yet, in FCC license
auctions, it has been associated with the same signaling strategies as those associated with jump
bidding.41
The strategy of retaliatory bidding entails placing bids on the licenses bid upon by rivals,
restricting the rival‘s ability to bid on the licenses the bidder actually desires to win. For
example, if a bidder is interested in license A and another bidder is interested in licenses A and
B, the first bidder can drive up the price of B, signaling that the second bidder should cease
bidding on A. Many bidding strategies have emerged, and a host of FCC rules on bidder
eligibility and withdrawal have been adopted in response. Insofar as collusive strategies arise,
they stem from regulator‘s provision of full information on bidder identities, bids submitted, and
other information (Banks et al. 2002), making a case for not providing such information in these
types of open auctions. Beginning in 2008 (Auction 73) the FCC adopted anonymous bidding,
revealing only the number of bidders who place bids for each license and the amount of the
current highest bid.42 Such non-disclosure rules have benefits but also costs, in that firm
executives are bound by extensive FCC regulations regarding inter-firm communications, rules
adopted to protect the secrecy of bidder identities.
While many of the flaws in the FCC rules were anticipated by the experimental
economics literature it appears many of the flaws are fixable and have been fixed. ―A close
examination of the problems experienced in the US in the middle of the 1990s, however, shows
that they were relatively minor glitches to a very successful program of spectrum assignment‖
(Scanlan 2001, p. 690). That is the mainstream view, and it garners justifiable support.
However, as we will argue below, one major change in the auction format, combinatorial
bidding, should be implemented.
2. Bidding Credits for Designated Entities
In the 1993 legislation authorizing auctions, Congress mandated that the FCC conduct its
competitive bidding procedures so as to fully include ―designated entities‖ (DEs). These were
defined as four types of companies: small businesses, rural telephone carriers, minority-owned
firms, female-owned firms. Due to a U.S. Supreme Court case sharply limiting the use of
government preferences assigned on the basis of race or gender,43 the FCC dropped the latter two
categories. Small businesses and rural carriers, as defined by the Commission, would be eligible
40

Jump bidding is also used to ensure that one‘s bid is not tied, in which case, one of the tied bids is randomly
selected to be the provisionally winning bid, and the others are discarded.
41
There is a potential strategic reason for jump bidding called ―notch bidding‖ in which a bidder will jump to
foreclose a bidder whose value is less than the current bid plus the minimum increment (Isaac et al. 2005).
42
Details of the basic FCC auction design are discussed in Porter and Smith (2006).
43
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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for favorable treatment to effectively subsidize their bidding as per a policy crafted in 1995. 44
The rationale was that these companies were handicapped in accessing capital markets; in an
open auction without such government protection, larger firms would out-bid them. Both
bidding credits were extended, and license set-asides (barring bids from non-DEs) were imposed
to remedy this situation.
This was not well thought out. Put yourself in the position of a bidder who could use
credits (other peoples‘ money) to supplement whatever would have been your cash bid. The
bidding credits induced over-bidding in auctions, producing winning bids much higher than
those registered for similar licenses awarded without DE credits. That the bidding credits were
extended as low-interest long-term loans exacerbated the effect; bids net of the credits were far
above the non-subsidized bids in previous PCS auctions. The ensuing defaults and bankruptcies
that occurred were a direct product of the fact that the firms granted such credits were neither
efficient service providers nor, therefore, strong bidders. By encouraging awards to inefficient
firms, the main purpose of the auction was thwarted. And it fails to incorporate the salient fact
that, by sacrificing up front auction revenue in favor of efficiency, increases (in service markets)
wealth creation, and much greater downstream government tax revenue will be captured.
This reveals the severe tension between auctions and preferences. When a ―small
business‖ is afforded a bidding credit, it attracts more intense bidding, wiping out the advantage
afforded. This outcome was virtually assured by the designation ―small business,‖ and the rules
that the FCC used to define such entities: firms with limited financial resources (including
collateral). This approach was explicitly taken to help firms that would otherwise have difficulty
obtaining credit in order to bid for licenses. But the reason that firms without financial standing
have limited access to capital markets is that such firms are relatively bad bets.
In the 1996 PCS C block auction (No. 5), the FCC saw winning bids more than twice as
high, net of bidding credits, as had been paid in the (unsubsidized PCS A and B) auction the year
before.45 DE bidders extended 40% bidding credits. (In other words, if a DE bids 100, that bid
is registered as 140 in the auction but, were the DE bidder to win, would pay just 100.) And
DEs were allowed to pay winning bids over ten years, interest-only for the first four, at an
interest rate equal to that on long-term U.S. Treasury Bonds (then about 6.5%). This constituted
a considerable financing subsidy for firms‘ whose cost of capital would have been about 14%
(Hazlett and Boliek 1999).
Moreover, it created a lucrative financial option. Bidders could bid aggressively to win,
make their first interest-only payment, then see whether license value exceeded what they had
bid. If so, they would finance their network, build-out, and then pay the government. If not,
they could declare bankruptcy and seek protection from their creditor – the federal government.
Indeed, they could ask a bankruptcy court to reduce their obligation. That is what the largest C

44

Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act – Competitive Bidding, Fifth Report and Order, 9
FCC Rcd 5532, ¶ 115 (1994).
45
The DE set-asides and bidding credits are explained in Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of
Eligibility Restrictions on C Block Licenses in the Broadband Personal Communication Services, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, RM-11019 (rel. Oct. 15, 2004), par. 2.
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block winners did (Hazlett and Boliek 1999).46 GWI bid about $1.1 billion for licenses, but
received permission from a U.S. Bankruptcy Court to satisfy its debt by paying just $200 million.
Nextwave, having emerged the largest PCS C winner in 1996 with $4.8 billion in licenses, ended
up paying just $1.6 billion in cash to the FCC – two-thirds of which was paid, without interest, in
2004.47
By exacerbating the winner‘s curse, and driving licenses to inefficient suppliers, the FCC
destroyed huge increments of consumer welfare. PCS spectrum was allocated in 1989-94.
Auction 5 (concluded May 1996) assigned C licenses and Auction 11 (concluded January 1997)
assigned F licenses. It then took until settlements and transactions conducted in 2004 and FCC
Auction 58 (concluded February 2005) to assign most C and F block license rights to operators.
This deprived the mobile market of about 30 MHz of nationwide bandwidth, raising prices to
retail customers. The loss in efficiency of this input truncation amounted to at least $65 billion
(Hazlett and Muñoz 2009).
The irony was that some economists had greeted aspects of the bidding credits program
enthusiastically, on the grounds that it would increase net auction receipts. By subsidizing rivals
to established incumbent carriers, such carriers would be forced to bid more aggressively. The
designated entities would not emerge victorious but serve as bidding shills used by ―the house‖
to drive up the stakes of the game (Ayers and Cramton 1996). The analysis implicitly assumed
that the government could calibrate the credits to perfectly strike a balance, driving up receipts
without awarding licenses to sub-standard service suppliers. Prescience is an ambitious
assumption for public policy. When violated, weak bidders actually win licenses, perform
relatively poorly, and reduce consumer welfare. This is what happened endemically and
sensationally in the PCS-C and PCS-F block auctions, as described, resulting in extremely large
social losses. While the FCC no longer extends credit to winning bidders, it continues to favor
weak bidders with bidding credits, raising the probability that productive efficiencies will be lost
and output markets will exhibit degraded performance (Ayers and Cramton 1996).
3. License Fragmentation and the Lack of Package Bids
License fragmentation continues to unnecessarily complicate bidding strategies, exposing
bidders attempting to create regional or national coverage areas to higher levels of risk than need
be the case. The efficiency of property rights assignments is therein reduced. It also leads to
relatively lengthy auctions that, combined with FCC non-disclosure rules, deter auction
participation -- perversely reducing competitive network entry.
U.S. spectrum policy is unique in its reliance on extreme license fragmentation. Virtually
all countries issue national licenses for mobile telephone service; a few countries issue large
regional licenses.
In economic terms, the (easily) most important wireless market is for mobile phones.
The FCC calls this Commercial Mobile Radio Services, or ―CMRS,‖ and it includes cellular,
46

PCS F block licenses auctioned in 1997 were also subject to the same subsidy rules.
Federal Communications Commission, FCC Announces NextWave Settlement Agreement, Press Release (April
20, 2004). NextWave also returned some of its licenses to the FCC.
47
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personal communications services (PCS), specialized mobile radio (SMR), advanced wireless
services (AWS) and 700 MHz licenses. The FCC created 734 local cellular franchise areas,
issuing two duopoly licenses in each. In PCS, multiple maps were used; A and B blocks
consisted of 51 licenses nationwide; C, D, E and F of 493 licenses – 2,074 licenses in all. Today,
including more than 47,000 SMR licenses (issued by local market and channel), there are at least
53,774 licenses used by U.S. mobile carriers. The equilibrium number of licenses appears to be
somewhere about four (meaning four combinations of thousands of elemental licenses), given
the fact that 90% percent of U.S. mobile service revenues are accounted for by Verizon, AT&T,
Sprint and T-Mobile.48
The formats adopted for license auctions have reflected the ―fragmentation preferences‖
of policy makers. Wireless operators bidding on licenses generally demand regional or
nationwide spectrum inputs. This makes licenses complements. On the other hand, the
existence of alternative license types within the same auction presents chances for substitution.
At a small cost penalty (in the added complexity in base station and handset radios), bidders can
aggregate licenses across bands to achieve their geographic coverage goals.
Taking this general spectrum allocation approach as a given, the economists who helped
craft FCC auction rules saw that simple bidding formats – such as sealed bids – would not
produce optimal results. Auctions would generate both greater revenue and more efficient
results (resources going to the most efficient operators) were values of complements and
substitutes revealed as bids were being formulated. This led to the now familiar simultaneous
ascending auction (SAA) format, also known as a sequential, multi-round auction (SMR).49
Inefficiencies yet arise, however, due to risks bidders face in assembling complementary
sets of licenses.50 The solution to this problem is to include package (combinatorial) bids. The
FCC rejected this path in 1994, because combinatorial auctions have been thought to face
difficult computational issues, sometimes referred to by Michael Rothkopf as the 2N bogeyman
(Porter and Smith 2006). Despite substantial improvements in auction software and numerous
FCC announcements (dating to 200051) that it would adopt such methods,52 the Commission has

48

Approximately 51,597 licenses were held by U.S. carriers in 2003, prior to the auction of 1,087 AWS licenses in
Sept. 2006 and 1,090 700 MHz licenses in March 2008. See Appendix 1 for a summary of U.S. license auctions.
For the 2003 license distribution across regulatory categories, see Hazlett (2003), 193. Note that SMR licenses were
largely assigned by the FCC prior to the advent of auctions, and then reassembled in secondary markets.
49
Porter and Smith (2006, p. 65-66). See also Milgrom (2004).
50
There is overwhelming evidence that wireless licenses issued in different geographic areas are highly
complementary. The FCC has issued a remarkably high number of mobile services licenses, nearly 50,000, only to
see market bidding (both in government auctions and secondary market transactions) piece together four national
networks (Hazlett 2003). Moreover, networks are heavily biased in their acquisitions, aggregating particular
spectrum blocks. Nextel (now owned by Sprint) built its national network exclusively with Specialized Mobile
Radio (SMR) licenses, e.g., deploying 800 MHz and 900 MHz frequencies scarcely used by other carriers. This
reality has led regulators in virtually every other developed country to issue mobile services licenses with far larger
footprints – almost always national, in fact – while maintaining rivalry between three and five carriers.
51
Federal Communications Commission, Conference on Combinatorial Bidding (May 5-7, 2000), agenda here:
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm? job=conference_agenda&y=2000.
52
Ibid.
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yet to widely deploy package bidding.53 Indeed, the combinatorial clock auction discussed in
Porter et al. (2003) has been shown to be highly efficient and does not needlessly suffer from
computational complexity.
With such a mechanism, firms could bid for the set of licenses they desire. Otherwise,
they are forced to bid for each license individually, uncertain of the prices they will have to pay
to obtain complementary assets. This uncertainty is the source of ―aggregation risk‖ (Bykowsky
et al. 2000). To achieve national coverage, a new entrant must bid on scores of properties
without knowing how high prices will go. Should the firm emerge as the high bidder on a
number of licenses, but then see prices for complementary licenses climb higher than anticipated,
it will be forced to make difficult choices. Either it will exceed its budget, or attempt to exit the
auction. The problem with the latter is that there is no guarantee that it will be outbid on all
licenses where it is currently the provisional winning bidder. If it holds some fraction of its
intended coverage map when the auction ends, it‘s best option may then be to liquidate at fire
sale prices.
Rules to mitigate this effect—short of combinatorial auction forms that allow bidders to
select packages in real time—appear to have backfired. It has been shown that an FCC rule
allowing bid withdrawals (with penalties), designed to lessen the impact of failed aggregations,
actually results in more losses when licenses have strong complementarities (Porter 1999).
Hence, firms can easily find themselves having to unload holdings at fire sale prices postauction, or upping bids to buy ‗fill-in‘ licenses at higher prices than it estimated to be profitable.
Firms can avoid either position by simply choosing not to enter the auction in the first place
(Bulow et al. 2009).
Hence, aggregation risk diminishes competitive bidding, lowering revenues and
potentially decreasing efficiency in the output market.54 One indication that this risk is
substantial is seen in the premium generally paid for larger licenses where size is measured in
license area population (―pops‖) or in frequency space (MHz), as in the 2006 AWS auction. See
Figure 2. Large regional licenses – D, E, F (12 licenses covering the U.S.) – generally sold for
substantially more than did smaller licenses – A (734 licenses), B (176), C (176).55 The F block,
with 20 MHz, sold for more than D and E blocks, allocated 10 MHz each. The larger B and C
licenses sold for more than did the smallest licenses, in A.
There was one important anomaly, however, in B license prices. The B band – 20 MHz
allocated to 176 licenses – was less expensive than the C band – with 10 MHz distributed across
176 licenses. The (176) B licenses were also cheaper than the (734) A licenses. Almost all B
licenses were won by SpectrumCo, a consortium of cable companies that held no existing
wireless assets. Bazelon (2009) argues that the AWS auction, including the small slicing of
licenses and the lack of package bidding, was efficient given that an entrant successfully
53

The 700 MHz auction (No. 73) in March 2008 allowed package bids for the 12 large regional licenses, but not
for the 1,100 other licenses. Obviously, package bidding is most useful in rationalizing the smaller licenses.
54
Combinatorial bids are useful whether the complementarities are weak or strong. If the latter, non-combination
auctions may result in severe aggregation risk, but market trading (including transactions in post-auction secondary
markets) is likely to piece together efficiently-sized rights bundles. If the former, transactions costs may outweigh
gains of reassembly, and inefficiently-configured packages may persist.
55
License prices are generally quoted in $price/MHz/pop, a convention we follow here.
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acquired 20 MHz of national coverage at a price of $2.4 billion – saving $1 billion to $1.5 billion
versus what the other two largest auction winners (T-Mobile and Verizon) paid. That was a
remarkable outcome (Bazelon 2009). Bulow, Levin and Milgrom (2009) detail the bidding
strategy of SpectrumCo as highly successful, particularly its early use of a nine-increment jump
bid (the largest allowed under the AWS rules). From a social standpoint, however, such price
differentials suggest that the input market has yet to reflect competitive equilibrium. Auction
rules should invite bidders to purchase productive assets at competitive prices, not hire expensive
strategy consultants to overcome aggregation risk.56

Fig. 2. Mean Prices for Different-Sized Licenses in the AWS Auction (Sept. 2006)
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Two basic policy reforms would promote further progress. The first, discussed above,
would provide for package bidding in auctions. The second entails further liberalization of
spectrum use, allowing market access – via liberal licenses -- to more bandwidth. This would
increase market liquidity, eliminating price differentials. Engorging the supply side would, of
course, extend productive opportunities and liquefy capital markets where wireless service
providers shop for spectrum inputs (Kwerel and Williams 2002). We discuss the general
efficiencies of this approach below.
4. Under-allocation of Radio Spectrum Ownership Rights
56

A disclosure may be of interest: Coleman Bazelon, Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, Paul Milgrom, Thomas
Hazlett and David Porter all served as consultants to SpectrumCo.
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License auctions do not reform the underlying resource allocation system. Hence, they
do not solve the essential social coordination problem confronted in Coase (1959): how to make
most efficient use of radio spectrum. That is because the rights auctioned by regulators are yet
created by administrative allocation, the state property regime imposed by policy makers on the
premise that ―the invisible resource‖ (Levin 1971)57 did not admit to private ownership.
The general liberalization of spectrum property rights is the more ambitious public policy
enterprise. While it has witnessed less decisive adoption than auctions, it has achieved more farreaching success in economic welfare terms. As in other countries, the FCC has afforded wide
discretion – what it calls ―flexible use‖ – to licensees in particular cases, most notably in mobile
telecommunications service licenses (Kwerel and Williams 2002; Hazlett and Spitzer 2006).58
This has proven a powerful ―proof of concept‖ for spectrum property rights, Coase‘s principal
normative recommendation. Exclusive ownership rights have been implemented without major
strain (indeed, barely any institutional notice) on the regulatory system. Competitive licensees,
endowed with control of bandwidth, have coordinated complex economic activities that would
be less efficiently supplied under alternative rules, ushering in waves of welfare-enhancing
investment and innovation. There is no serious opposition to the proposition that ―flexible use‖
has offered substantial improvements over the ―command and control‖ mechanisms of the state
property regime (Hatfield and Weiser 2006; Faulhaber 2006; Weiser 2008).59
Exclusive ownership rights enable spectrum markets to allocate bandwidth. Important
efficiency conditions are revealed. Trades are commonly made in bundled form, combining
airwave access with network services.60 Wireless carriers retain integrated control over
bandwidth and complementary communications infrastructure. Resources are nonetheless
shared, intensely. A mobile phone network will sell bundled access to millions of subscribers,
dozens of wireless service retailers (such as virtual network operators), and thousands of
application providers. These latter may contract directly with the network (as when customers of
Amazon download books on their Kindles, using the Sprint network but paying Amazon) or via
vendors setting up their own wireless platforms (as when 85,000 Apple App Store applications
come onto iPhones accessing the AT&T network via a contract with Apple) (Hazlett 2011).
Administrative allocation yet imposes artificial scarcity. No more than about 12% of the
total bandwidth under 3.5 GHz (the most valuable frequencies) is thusly allocated in the U.S.61
57

The late Prof. Levin‘s work is cited for its apt phrase, not for the analytical errors made by regulators – and
corrected by both Coase and Levin.
58
The alert reader will note the irony in speaking of ―flexible use‖ in the context of licenses crafted to provide a
specific set of services (like ―cellular telecommunications‖). The Coasean path would lead to ―spectrum licenses.‖
59
Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, Federal Communications Commission, REPORT 11–
17 (2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.pdf..
60
Of course, ‗raw spectrum‘ changes hands in the form of license sales, secondary market activity that has long
existed. Once networks are constructed, however, the ubiquitous business model is to retain spectrum control under
one organizational roof, and share bandwidth by selling bundled access rights.
61
According to a survey of OECD members by the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association
(Summer 2009), the U.S. has authorized 409 MHz for use by wireless carriers. (Of this, 142 MHz were allocated to
licenses sold in 2006 and 2008, and the bandwidth has not yet been deployed. The AWS licenses auctioned in 2006
have incumbent clearing operations which continue to delay new mobile deployments.) This constitutes, 11.6% of
the prime bandwidth under 3.5 GHz. Only 50 MHz was identified as being ―in the pipeline‖ for new FCC
authorizations.
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Since the advent of auctions, which began with so-called second generation (2G) cellular
licenses in the mid-1990s, further allocations have been slow. In the early 2000s, the FCC
slowed the release of mobile licensed spectrum – 3G licenses – in favor of additional unlicensed
bandwidth (Werbach 2004). The Bush Administration explicitly delayed additional mobile
license auctions in early 2001 on the grounds that such delays would be a ―win win.‖62 The dual
gains came from helping wireless carriers, which claimed that they were then facing an
economic downturn and did not need more bandwidth, and government coffers, which were
estimated to receive higher revenues if sales were pushed back several years. Missing from this
starving man theory of restaurant management (the customers will pay more if you wait until
they‘re really hungry) was any consideration of consumer welfare. Despite the explosive growth
in wireless services and burgeoning demand for spectrum inputs by carriers, the period 1996
through 2005 saw the release of no new bandwidth for mobile services, constraining network
expansion, as reflected in the dearth of auction revenues generated during these years. See
Figure 3.
FIG. 3. FCC AUCTION REVENUES (EX AUCTIONS 5, 35) ($BIL.)63

Moreover, U.S. regulators have reversed course on liberalization. For the 700 MHz
licenses, allocated UHF TV frequencies being abandoned by broadcasters with the analog
switch-off (completed June 2009), the FCC conditioned different regulatory regimes. Licenses
sold at auction were embedded with mandates to give priority to public safety communications
traffic, or to provide ―open access‖ for all wireless devices and applications. These licenses
received sharply lower bids than licenses sold without such restrictions; indeed, the national ―D‖
license, allocated 10 MHz, received no bid at or above the reserve price, such that the bandwidth
62

―To the industry‘s relief, FCC Chairman Michael Powell, with the blessing of Secretary of Commerce Donald
Evans, recently halted a mandate from former President Clinton that would have required all government branches
to identify suitable 3G spectrum by July 30 of this year and auction it off by September 2002.‖ Lynette Luna,
Spectrum Quandary Puts 3G At Risk, TELEPHONY ONLINE (July 23, 2001). See also, Patrick Ross, Bush Wants to
Delay Airwave Auction, CNET NEWS.COM (April 9, 2001).
63
Source: FCC (see Appendix 1). Auction 5 (PCS C) produced bids that largely went uncollected. Auction 35
(PCS C re-auction) bids went entirely uncollected.
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continues to lie idle. The compatibility of old-style FCC micro-management with license
auctions was theoretically clear, and well stated in Coase (1959). But benefits of market
allocation are lost.
Ironically, given their common normative roots, competitive bidding for licenses may
undermine spectrum liberalization. By eliminating the rents awarded to new licensees, auctions
tend to reduce the political demand for bandwidth supplements. Lacking more fundamental
reforms in the system of spectrum allocation, license auctions may make the regulatory regime
even more conservative.
a. Where‘s the Bandwidth?
This tension flows from the regulator‘s structurally passive role in spectrum allocation,
coupled with the bi-level nature of the regulatory process. First, spectrum allocations are
generally triggered by one or more interested parties formally requesting that the FCC
accommodate new services. Second, if the FCC acts, entrants must then obtain licenses created
in the allocation. There are risks of failure at either level; unless both the allocation and the
license are obtained, the entrant wastes any investment in promoting regulatory change.64
Under the comparative hearing system, there was an implicit property right awarded to
lobbyists for new allocations: if the Commission was persuaded to allocate spectrum for a new
service, those who had petitioned the agency to achieve this policy would likely stand first in
line, ahead of rival license applicants. With the switch to auctions, the queue is eliminated. The
returns to innovation are thereby reduced. That part of the innovation that is specific to
developing a new FCC allocation receives no payment. Competitors will free ride on the
innovator‘s efforts, having equal standing in the auction.
License auctions are designed to eliminate wasteful rent seeking, a useful contribution.
But they may simultaneously reduce incentives for productive rent seeking. 65 This lessens
pressure for spectrum allocations. The strategy of liberalization, of which license auctions are a
key component, may include offsets. The demonstration effect of market allocation of licenses
may itself propel reforms that generally enable more bandwidth to be used by market
participants. This may be observed in countries that have, in instituting auctions, jumped ahead
to also reform the underlying allocation regime.66

64

This scenario omits the possibility that the entrant seeks unlicensed spectrum, but can be easily extended to
encompass unlicensed allocations, however, which sharply increased in the U.S. following the introduction of
license auctions. This outcome was consistent with the rent seeking dynamics outlined here. As license rents were
taxed away in competitively bid assignments, relative returns to rent seeking for unlicensed allocations increased.
Rent seeking (or defending) activity by incumbents strategically intending to deter competitive entry via licensed
spectrum buttresses the effect.
65
The importance of rent seeking for the provision of valuable public goods was articulated in Lee, (1999).
66
In addition to the statutory reforms instituted, 1989-1997, in Australia, New Zealand, Guatemala and El
Salvador, the U.K. and Norway have promoted spectrum liberalization through regulatory agency actions in recent
years. These policies attempt to allow private parties to bid for spectrum, not simply licenses allocated
administratively on a case-by-case basis.
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In the U.S., however, weakened pressure for new allocations, combined with political
arguments favoring revenue maximization, produced a spectrum drought, 1997-2006. The
spectrum lags did not go unnoticed; Congress mandated additional auctions, using TV band
spectrum, beginning in 2000. But the FCC, lobbied by incumbent carriers to delay new license
sales, postponed these auctions. The Bush Administration joined this dirigiste campaign in
2001. As Gerald Faulhaber wrote in 2006:
The sorry result is that cellular companies are straining within their bandwidth
restrictions and are unable to obtain new bandwidth to expand their business.
Meanwhile, large amounts of bandwidth are currently occupied by VHF and UHF
television broadcasters, even as the audience for broadcast-delivered TV
shrinks… (Faulhaber 2006, p. 262).
When the de facto ban on bandwidth was lifted, the Sept. 2006 auction of AWS licenses
(allocated 90 MHz) and the March 2008 sale of 700 MHz licenses (allocated 52 MHz of UHF
TV frequencies) sold to hungry spectrum consumers who spent lavishly. Some $33 billion in
receipts was received by the U.S. Government – 62% of the total revenues collected from July
1994.
One consequence of the policy-imposed, decade-long spectrum drought period was a
merger wave. In 2004, there were six major nationwide carriers: Verizon, Cingular, AT&T
Wireless, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Nextel. In 2004-05, however, Cingular (a joint venture of SBC
and BellSouth) acquired AT&T Wireless for $41 billion, while Sprint bought Nextel for $35
billion. When the dust settled, four national carriers remained. The two combinations were both
driven, in large part, by a demand to access additional bandwidth; both networks launched 3G
upgrades post-merger.67 T-Mobile, which did not acquire additional significant spectrum during
the drought period, had to delay its 3G services68 until 2008, when its newly purchased
bandwidth – it was the largest winning bidder in the AWS auction, spending $4.2 billion on
licenses – enabled the roll-out of new high-speed data services with a network upgrade costing
$2.7 billion.69
The current spectrum holdings of the four national carriers are seen in Figure 4. By
aggregating licenses, network operators have assembled bandwidth blocks of consistent size
(and, although not shown, frequencies). The relentlessness of market incentives masks a good
deal of inefficiency. Thousands of secondary market transactions have contributed to these
holdings, as have many FCC auctions. Firms have devoted much energy, not to mention tens of
67

―Cingular Wireless, the nation's largest cellphone service provider, announced plans yesterday to upgrade its
high-speed data network, allowing faster downloads than are now available on many home broadband connections.
The upgrade will start at the end of 2005, and the network will be in place nationwide by 2006, Cingular said. .. In
October, Cingular Wireless closed its acquisition of AT&T Wireless, creating the nation's largest wireless company
with 47 million subscribers. Cingular said the acquisition gave it the additional radio spectrum necessary to deploy
the high-speed network.‖ Matt Richtel, Cingular to Upgrade Data Network, NY TIMES (Dec. 1, 2004).
68
―T-Mobile USA Inc. continues to lag behind its competitors in offering wide-area next-generation services, as
the carrier is still working on deploying EDGE services. The carrier also has stated it will be at least two years
before it has enough spectrum capacity to launch a UMTS-based network.‖ Dan Meyer, Verizon expands EV-DO,
Cingular says it's under no pressure to match speed, RCR WIRELESS NEWS (July 4, 2005).
69
Laurie Sullivan, T-Mobile Plans Major Cellular Upgrade To 3G, INFORMATION WEEK (Oct. 16, 2006).

Hazlett, Porter and Smith: Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Coase

page 26

billions of dollars of investment capital, to acquiring these asset portfolios. Milgrom criticizes
the laissez-faire attitude that initial assignments do not matter much, so long as the rights are ―in
the market‖ (Milgrom 2004, p. 19-21). It is a point worth making; institutions should be shaped
to reduce such social expense. But, again, Coasean symmetry is called for. If auctions tend to
delay the release of additional bandwidth to market participants, gains from competitive bidding
for licenses can be swamped by the costs of idle spectrum. The slow flow of spectrum during
the license auction period in the U.S. is surely a cause for concern. The remedy is not in
abandoning auctions, but in structural reforms that push the auction more deeply into the
spectrum allocation function.
FIG. 4. DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILE CARRIER BANDWIDTH70

B. De-liberalization.
Driven both by an intellectual consensus among economists71 and social demands to
adopt more efficient license distributions,72 U.S. spectrum allocation underwent a quiet but
striking period of deregulatory reform, 1975-2000. During that time private satellites were
authorized, cable TV operators were allowed to compete with broadcasters, content rules were
relaxed for radio and TV stations, satellite TV and radio operators were licensed, and cellular
and PCS licenses were issued. Spectrum policy was fundamentally altered in the liberalization
of mobile licenses; initially, cellular operators were mandated to provide a particular service with
a given (analog) technology, and the location of transmission facilities was fixed in the license.

70

Source: Blair Levin, What 700 MHz Winners Can Do With Their Spectrum, Stifel Nicolas (April 15, 2008), 4.
T=AT&T; VZ=Verizon; S=Sprint.
71
See Gregory L. Rosston et al., Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, Comment submitted to the Federal
Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 00-230 (Feb. 7, 2001).
72
For theoretical and empirical discussions of how spectrum policy has been reformed, see Hazlett (2001, 1998).
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By the time PCS permits were allocated in 1995, operators could select their own
(digital) technology, provide voice, data, or video services, and had wide latitude in choice of
business models. Disparate licenses – cellular, SMR, PCS – were unified under the CMRS
(Commercial Mobile Radio Service) regime, allowing flexibility to licensees and promoting
competition across otherwise disparate markets. The policy objective shifted from detailed
specification of technology, equipment, network architecture, and service, to an effort to ―license
spectrum.‖
Yet the traditional administrative system for allocating spectrum rights remained in place.
And in recent years the political equilibrium at the FCC has retreated, slowing or reversing the
path to liberal licenses. Important policies that resulted include the allocation of a 50 MHz
―WiMax‖ band (3650-3700 MHz) for unlicensed rather than licensed use in 2005; the 700 MHz
C block ―open access‖ rules adopted in 2007; the 700 MHz D block ―public safety‖ license plan
adopted in 2007; and the TV band ―white spaces‖ allocation for unlicensed devices (sharing the
294 MHz of ―DTV spectrum‖) in 2008.
· 3650-3700 MHz. A swath of 50 MHz adjacent to 3.5 GHz, the most popular international
band for emerging WiMax services, was set aside for unlicensed devices in a 2005
Order. The FCC rejected a proposal from Intel and Alvarion (ironically, two of the
largest manufacturing firms in the unlicensed device space) to largely allocate the
bandwidth to liberal licenses. Instead, it issued non-exclusive use rights while requiring
a registration system (to identify the location of transmissions) for users and mandating
that operators adopt reasonable ―contention-based protocols‖ to mitigate interference.
This approach shifts the task of devising and regulating spectrum sharing etiquettes from
profit-maximizing firms to the government (Brito 2007). As of mid-2009, the band
supplied virtually no subscriber services.73
· 700 MHz C License “Open Access” Rules. In crafting rules for the licenses to be
auctioned in 2008 the FCC determined that the winner of the 22 MHz C license (the
largest in the auction) would be obligated to provide non-discriminatory network access
for all devices and applications.74 This mandate leaves many details unanswered; it is
73

Maravedis data from 2Q2009 registered 1,600 subscribers of wireless broadband services in the band, all of
which were business customers. In contrast, 461,000 retail customers subscribed to Clearwire, offering service on
licensed 2.5 GHz airwaves obtained in secondary market transactions from original licensees.
74
The C Licensee is mandated by the FCC not to:
· Block, degrade, or interfere with the ability of end users to download and utilize applications of their choosing on
the licensee‘s Block C network, subject to reasonable network management. Wireless service providers subject
to this requirement will not be allowed to disable features or functionality in handsets where such action is not
related to reasonable network management and protection, or compliance with applicable regulatory
requirements. For example, providers may not ―lock‖ handsets to prevent their transfer from one system to
another.
· Block Wi-Fi access, MP3 playback ringtone capability, or other services that compete with wireless service
providers‘ own offerings.
· Exclude applications or devices solely on the basis that such applications or devices would unreasonably increase
bandwidth demands.
· Impose any additional discriminatory charges (one-time or recurring) or conditions on customers who seek to use
devices or applications outside of those provided by the licensee.
· Deny access to a customer‘s device solely because that device makes use of other wireless spectrum bands, such
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not clear how far prices and technologies – as distinct from Acceptable Use Policies –
may exclude devices or applications. Verizon won the C block, capturing a 60%
discount attributed, in substantial measure, to the regulatory liability assumed.75 If the
discount resulted in superior retail market performance, it could well be justified. Yet,
as seen in the current rivalry between RIM Blackberry, Apple iPhone, and Google
gPhone, platform competitive business models locate across an ―open–closed‖
continuum (Hazlett 2011) It is not the case that ―open‖ access models invariably
outperform; it is clearly the case that some ―closed‖ platforms drive rivalry and deliver
consumer benefits. Categorical restrictions by regulators diminish rivalry, tax the
innovative process, and foreclose valuable options. This approach re-institutes the
license rigidities of traditional spectrum regulation.
· 700 MHz D Block. The FCC imposed expensive obligations on the 10 MHz D license,
requiring the winning bidder to give priority access to public safety agencies (fire,
police, emergency ‗first responders‘) in a hybrid (commercial/public safety) wireless
network. Extensive build-out obligations were also imposed, requiring network
coverage of 75% of U.S. population by 2013, 95% by 2016 and 99.3% by 2019. No bid
exceeded the reserve price of $1.3 billion. At the mean price/MHz-pop for A, B, C, and
E licenses, D would have generated $3.9 billion. Instead, 10 MHz lies dormant.

In the 700 MHz license auction concluded in March 2008, the underlying spectrum was
virtually identical across properties.76 Yet price variances were very large. See Table 3. The C
block sold for 29% of the adjusted price of the B block despite the aggregation premium on the
larger-bandwidth C licenses. The C licenses, at B prices, would have cost Verizon nearly $16.6
billion -- $11.8 billion more. Of course, the D license did not sell, even at a reserve price onethird of the average obtained for the other licenses. This is evidence that regulatory rules and
spectrum allocation procedures continue to distort markets. Bandwidth continues to be allocated
not to where consumers desire it to be used, but where administrative mechanisms steer it. 77

as cellular or PCS spectrum.
Bingham Law firm summary (Aug. 15, 2007); http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=5492.
75
Verizon paid $4.7 billion for licenses allocated 22 MHz of nationwide spectrum; at the mean prices for the other
comparable licenses sold in the auction (the A and B licenses also having paired spectrum) it would have paid $11.8
billion, or 2.5 times as much.
76
Boundary conditions were a bit different. The A licenses were allocated spectrum adjacent to TV Channel 51,
e.g., where digital television broadcasts would cause some conflicts in (relatively few) markets where such TV
stations broadcast. Another difference was that the E license was offered as a single ―block‖ and not as ―paired‖
spectrum. This, however, reflects administrative discretion.

In placing ―open access‖ requirements on the C license, FCC policy makers effectively allocated
spectrum for the benefit of application providers like Google that lobbied for the rules. By allowing such
firms to direct resources without absorbing the costs of the resulting allocation, free rider problems
emerge. See Brusco, et al. (2009).
77
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Table 3. Average Prices for Different Licenses in 700 MHz Auction (March 2008)
Block
A
B
C
E
TOTAL

Net Winning Bids ($)
3,875,663,800
9,068,382,850
4,746,691,000
1,266,844,500
18,957,582,150

MHz * Pops
3,419,018,088
3,419,018,088
6,283,649,790
1,713,722,670
14,833,358,892

$/MHz/pop
1.13
2.65
0.76
0.74
1.28

Source: Blair Levin, Special Focus: The Wireless World After 700 MHz, Stifel Nicolas (March, 2008), p. 4.

The degree to which the regulatory system distorts spectrum values is suggested in Figure
5, showing the price (adjusted for MHz and population in the licensed areas) paid across U.S.
auctions divided by the mean price paid across all auctions.78 CMRS licenses, embedding a
(mostly) homogeneous set of licensee property rights, are denoted, and exhibit less variance than
the non-CMRS sample. See also Table 4. Although economic factors, including overall market
conditions and frequency location, alter bids over time, the extreme variance in FCC license
prices is difficult to explain by changing economic circumstances alone. The distinct nature of
the rights granted in different licenses, the manner in which spectrum is divvied up (or
channelized), and the credits extended to certain auction participants have served to create large
price variance.
FIG. 5. PRICE/MHZ/POP ACROSS U.S. LICENSE AUCTIONS, 1994-2008

78

There have been 72 FCC auctions; the mean price per MHz-pop (equally weighted across auctions) is 23.17¢.
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Table 4. FCC License Auction Prices: Means and Standard Deviations
All Auctions

CMRS Auctions

Non-CMRS Auctions

Mean Price per MHz ($)

0.46

1.16

0.33

Std. Dev. ($)

1.51

1.19

1.54

Certain licenses have been embedded with broad, flexible spectrum use rights that permit
licensees to determine services, business models, and technologies. In general, licenses used for
mobile voice and data services have been liberally endowed (Kwerel and Williams 2002). The
Coasean vision of functioning, efficient spectrum markets are thereby supported – and observed.
Most spectrum, however, continues to be allocated in highly restrictive ways, either bottled up in
little used government allocations or dedicated to traditional licenses granting sharply truncated
spectrum property rights.
That regulators seek to promote different services with different licenses constitutes an
industrial policy Gerald Faulhaber and David Farber dub ―GOSPLAN‖ (Faulhaber 2006, p. 265).
Satellite radio licenses, for example, permit only national broadcasts; targeted, localized content
is prohibited (to protect terrestrial radio stations). Satellite telephone operators are permitted to
provide ―ancillary terrestrial‖ mobile services only to augment satellite phone service, despite the
fact that ―land mobile‖ is likely to be the most efficient use of the band. Guard bands in 700
MHz frequencies have been heavily regulated, with licensees permitted only to operate on a
common carriage model imposed by the Commission. The rules have proven unworkable,
destroying the value of otherwise productive frequencies (Rosston 2003).
License auctions appear to have exacerbated the tendency of spectrum misallocation
under the regulatory regime, but the hypothesis is testable. The simpler point made here is that
competitive bidding for licenses is easily compatible with a policy regime in which spectrum is
allocated as state property. Absent more fundamental reforms, the ―price system‖ will continue
to be stymied in its effort to efficiently allocate radio spectrum.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When Ronald Coase began his investigation of the regulation of radio waves, the
consensus view was that spillovers in the use of a resource disqualified markets as the efficient
form of social organization. Only the unified control exerted by an administrative agency of the
state could take into account the conflicts between rival users. Regulators, judges and industry
experts agreed.
Coase wondered why the coordination commonly seen in market transactions would fail
to obtain. Using the assumptions of prevailing economic models, he reasoned that they would
not: if private actors were as perfectly informed as were government regulators, they would set
ownership rules so as to maximize the value of output, sharing the gains. When the obscuring
assumption of perfect information was relaxed, then the source of coordination problems became
clear: ownership rights were not sufficiently established to permit the cooperation routinely
exhibited elsewhere in the economy.
Coase (1959) is best known as an advocacy essay promoting FCC license auctions.
Derided at first, the policy suggestion was eventually adopted in the U.S. by congressional
statute in 1993. Competitive bidding commenced the following year, capturing about $52 billion
in federal receipts in the years since. By rule of thumb, Coase‘s reform has generated at least
$17 billion in efficiency gains (via reductions in tax distortions), placing him in the company of
those rare scholars who can easily document the positive net social value of their research
agenda.
Yet this seminal paper was actually not a polemic, and spectrum auctions not its principal
legacy. What Coase fundamentally contributed was a symmetric analysis of property regime
choices, explaining how the costs of the ―price system‖ were real, but that so were the costs of
any alternative. The administrative allocation system, by restricting productive activities, was
also costly, and yet revealed none of the price information that would come from property
owners pursuing gains from trade. Lacking such data, resource allocation would be an exercise
in the dark.
Coase argued for analytical symmetry on logical grounds, and then expressed an
expectation that private property would outperform state property given the rich empirical
history of competing systems. He was open to correction; he, in fact, had little spectrum market
evidence to distinguish the most efficient path. But the ―invisible hand‖ generally worked.
Why not here? He became convinced that the general case would obtain in the special case of
radio spectrum when the arguments for administrative control were made. They were
―incredibly feeble,‖ and easily refuted by a law student who had fortuitously read Abba Lerner as
an undergraduate (Coase 1993, p. 249).
Thanks to changing technologies, evolving political equilibria, and the intellectual
consensus that Coase fundamentally reshaped, policy makers around the globe have begun
treating the spectrum allocated to mobile telecommunications licenses as de facto private
property. Decades of experience with comparative spectrum ownership institutions are now
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available for observation. The liberalization of private property rights has yielded extremely
large social gains, permitting complex market structures to develop. No other form of spectrum
allocation, including the ―command and control‖ once thought necessary to avoid tragedy of the
commons or the ―spectrum commons‖ recently heralded as the obsolescence of Coasean property
rights, supports such productive social coordination.
In this environment, new and interesting problems have appeared. Foremost among them
is the apparent conflict between license auctions and efficiency in spectrum allocation. Where
the price system is instituted to assign rights crafted under a non-market system, claimants bid
competitively and rents are captured by the state. Rights assignments are more efficient, but
dynamic pressure for the creation of new rights is reduced. Eliminating wasteful rent seeking,
and the misallocations designed to attract it, saves society resources. But a good measure of
productive rent seeking has been eliminated, as well. Spectrum policy makers may become less
subject to pressures for market entry.
While market allocation of radio spectrum, tried and tested, generally out-performs
administrative allocation, U.S. policy makers have remained in control of new spectrum
allocations and may have become even more conservative. Consumers, innovators, and a host
of industries visibly benefit from liberalization and would further gain from its extension. The
rivalry between these competing political forces will yet determine whether the disruptive clarity
of Ronald Coase will continue to drive spectrum property reforms to further frontiers of
efficiency.
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APPENDIX 1. FCC WIRELESS LICENSE AUCTIONS
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
15
16
17
18
20
21
22
23
24
25
27
26
28
30
80
33
34
36
35
38
39
40
41
42
43
82
44
45
32
46
48
49
54
50
51

Length Licenses
Total Revenue
Price per MHzAuction Name
Auction Date
(Days)
Sold
(Net Bids - $) Total MHz
Pop
Nationwide Narrowband PCS
7/25/1994 - 7/29/1994
5
10
650,306,674
0.7875
3.158716
Interactive Video & Data Services
7/28/1994 - 7/29/1994
2
594
213,892,375
1
0.81816
Regional Narrowband PCS
10/26/1994 - 11/8/1994
9
130
392,706,797
0.45
10.68398
Broadband PCS A & B
12/5/1994 - 3/13/1995
60
99
7,721,184,171
60
0.487617
Broadband PCS C
12/18/1995 - 5/6/1996
83
493 10,071,708,842
30
1.260233
Multipoint/Multichannel Distr.Services
11/13/1995 - 3/28/1996
75
493
216,239,603
78
0.886594
900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio
12/5/1995 - 4/15/1996
79
1020
204,267,144
10
0.077401
Direct Broadcast Satellite 110°
1/24/1996 - 1/25/1996
1.5
1
682,500,000
N/a
N/a
Direct Broadcast Satellite 148°
1/25/1996 - 1/26/1996
1.5
1
52,295,000
500
0.000393
Broadband PCS C (Re-auction)
7/3/1996 - 7/16/1996
8
18
904,607,467
30
0.11319
Broadband PCS D, E, F
8/29/1996 - 1/14/1997
85
1472(a)
2,517,439,565
30
0.312032
Cellular Unserved
1/13/1997 - 1/21/1997
6
14
1,842,533
N/a
N/a
Wireless Communications Service
4/15/1997 - 4/25/1997
9
126(b)
13,638,940
30
0.001691
Digital Audio Radio Service
4/1/1997 - 4/2/1997
2
2
173,234,888
25
0.025767
800 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio
10/28/1997 - 12/8/1997
27
524
96,232,060
10
0.035783
Local Multipoint Distribution System
2/18/1998 - 3/25/1998
26
864
578,663,029
1300
0.00164
220 MHz
9/15/1998 - 10/22/1998
26
693
21,650,301
N/a
N/a
VHF Public Coast
12/3/1998 - 12/14/1998
8
26(c)
7,459,200
0.05
0.549709
Location and Monitoring Service
2/23/1999 - 3/5/1999
9
289
3,438,294
14
0.000897
Block Broadband PCS C, D, E, F
3/23/1999 - 4/15/1999
17
302(d)
412,840,945
50
0.030153
LMDS Re-auction
4/27/1999 - 5/12/1999
12
161
45,064,450
1300
0.000127
220 MHz
6/8/1999 - 6-30-1999
17
222
1,924,950
1.55
0.004535
Closed Broadcast
9/28/1999 - 10/8/1999
9
115
57,820,350
N/a
N/a
Broadcast Auction
10/6/1999 - 10/8/1999
3
1
172,250
0.2
0.003145
929 & 931 MHz Paging Service
2/24/2000 - 3/2/2000
6
985
4,122,500
2
0.007324
Broadcast Auction
3/21/2000 - 3/24/2000
4
2
1,210,000
12
0.000358
39 GHz
4/12/2000 - 5/8/2000
19
2173
410,649,085
1400
0.001042
Blanco Texas Broadcast
7/12/2000 - 7/14/2000
3
1
18,798,000
N/a
N/a
Upper 700 MHz Guard Bands
9/6/2000 - 9/21/2000
12
96
519,892,575
6
0.307896
800 MHz SMR General Category
8/16/2000 - 9/1/2000
13
1030
319,451,810
1293.8
0.000877
800 MHz SMR Lower 80 Channels
11/1/2000 - 12/5/2000
22
2800
28,978,385
4
4.37
C & F Block Broadband PCS
12/12/2000 - 1/26/2001
24
422 16,857,046,150
70
0.845567
Upper 700 MHz Guard Bands (2001)
2/13/2001 - 2/21/2001
6
8
20,961,500
6
0.012267
VHF Public Coast Location Monitoring
6/6/2001 - 6/13/2001
6
217
1,144,755
14.05
0.000286
Paging
10/30/2001 - 12/5/2001
24
5323
12,897,127
2.12
0.021361
Narrowband PCS
10/3/2001 - 10/16/2001
8
317
8,285,036
1.8625
0.015619
Multiple Address Systems Spectrum
11/14/2001 - 11/27/2001
8
878(e)
1,202,725
0.825
0.005119
Mult-Radio Service
1/10/2002 - 1/17/2002
6
27(f)
1,548,225
30.5
0.000176
New Analog Television Stations
2/5/2002 - 2/13/2002
5
4
5,025,250
24
0.000726
Lower 700 MHz Band (2002)
8/27/2002 - 9/18/2002
16
484
88,651,630
18
0.017079
Cellular RSA
5/29/2002 - 6/4/2002
5
3
15,871,000
N/a
N/a
New AM Broadcast Stations
12/10/2002 - 12/12/2002
3
3
1,520,375
0.03
0.175744
1670-1675 MHz Nationwide License
4/30/2003
1
1
12,628,000
5
0.008685
Lower and Upper Paging Bands
5/13/2003 - 5/28/2003
11
2832
2,445,608
N/a
N/a
Lower 700 MHz Band (2003)
5/28/2003 - 6/13/2003
13
251
56,815,960
18
0.010854
Closed Broadcast (2003)
7/23/2003 - 7/29/2003
5
4
4,657,600
N/a
N/a
Narrowband PCS (2003)
9/24/2003 - 9/29/2003
4
48
428,709
0.6625
0.002225
Regional Narrowband (PCS) (2003)
9/24/2003 - 9/25/2003
2
5
134,250
0.125
0.003693
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52
53
55
56
57
37
58
59
60
61
81
63
62
64
65
66
68
69
70
71
72
73
77
78
85

Direct Broadcast Satellite Service
7/14/2004
Multichannel Video Distribution & Data
1/14/2004 - 1/27/2004
900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio
2/11/2004 - 2/25/2004
24 GHz Service
7/28/2004
Automated Maritime Telecom. System
9/15/2004
FM Broadcast
11/3/2004 - 11/23/2004
Broadband PCS (re-auction)
1/26/2005 - 2/15/2005
Multiple Address Systems Spectrum
4/26/2005 - 5/18/2005
Lower 700 MHz Band
7/20/2005 - 7/26/2005
Automated Maritime Telecom. System
8/3/2005 - 8/17/2005
Low Power Television (LPTV)
9/14/2005 - 9/26/2005
Multichannel Video Distribution & Data
12/7/2005
FM Broadcast (2006)
1/12/2006 - 1/31/2006
Full Power TV Construction Permits
3/15/2006 - 3/20/2006
800 MHz Air-Ground Radiotelephone
5/10/2006 - 6/2/2006
Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1)
8/9/2006 - 9/18/2006
FM Broadcast (1/2007)
1/10/2007 - 1/17/2007
1.4 GHz Bands
2/7/2007 - 3/8/2007
FM Broadcast (3/2007)
3/7/2007 - 3/26/2007
Broadband PCS (2007)
5/16/2007 - 5/21/2007
220 MHz
6/20/2007 - 6/26/2007
700 MHz Band
1/24/2008 - 3/18/2008
Closed Cellular Unserved
6/17/2008
AWS-1 & Broadband PCS
8/13/2008 - 8/20/2008
LPTV & TV Translator Digital Channels 11/5/2008 - 11/10/2008

1
9
10
1
1
14
15
17
5
11
9
1
13
4
15
28
5
21
14
4
5
38
1
6
4

3
192
55
7
10
258
217
2223
5
10
90
22
163
10
2
1087
9
64
111
33
76
1090(g)
1
53
30

12,200,000
118,721,835
4,861,020
216,050
1,057,365
147,876,075
2,043,230,450
3,865,515
305,155
7,094,350
834,600
133,160
54,259,600
23,367,850
38,339,000
13,700,267,150
3,264,250
123,599,000
21,301,175
13,932,150
185,416
18,957,582,150
25,002
21,276,850
134,725
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N/a
96000
5
400
2
51.6
120
0.7
12
2
540
11000
32.6
60
N/a
90
1.8
8
22.2
120
0.25
52
N/A
165
180

14.49

Average auction length
Average Price per MHz-pop

0.231747
27,484

Total Licenses
Total Winning Bids

77,998,345,602

Total Revenue Collected

52,621,436,577

Uncollected Revenue

25,376,909,025

Percent of High Bids Uncollected

N/a
4.21E-06
0.003311
1.84E-06
0.0018
0.009759
0.057444
0.01863
8.58E-05
0.011967
5.21E-06
4.08E-08
0.005559
0.001301
N/a
0.508437
0.006012
0.051223
0.003181
0.000385
0.002459
1.199004
N/a
0.000424
2.46E-06

32.54

a) Data comes from Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, and Paul Milgrom. 2009 "Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions", National Bureau of
Economic Research.
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